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Abstract  
Many argue that dogs show unique susceptibility to human communicative signals that make 
them suitable for being engaged in complex co-operation with humans. It has also been 
revealed that socially provided information is particularly effective in influencing the 
behaviour of dogs even when the human’s action demonstration conveys inefficient or 
mistaken solution of task. It is unclear, however, how the communicative nature of the 
demonstration context and the presence of the human demonstrator affect the dogs’ object-
choice behaviour in observational learning situations. In order to unfold the effects of these 
factors, 76 adult pet dogs could observe a communicative or a non-communicative 
demonstration in which the human retrieved a tennis ball from under an opaque container 
while manipulating another distant and obviously empty (transparent) one. Subjects were then 
allowed to choose either in the presence of the demonstrator or after she left the room. Results 
showed a significant main effect of the demonstration context (presence or absence of the 
human’s communicative signals), and we also found some evidence for the response-
modifying effect of the presence of the human demonstrator during the dogs’ choice. That is, 
dogs predominantly chose the baited container, but if the demonstration context was 
communicative and the human was present during the dogs’ choice, subjects’ tendency to 
select the baited container has been reduced. In agreement with the studies showing 
sensitivity to human’s communicative signals in dogs, these findings point to a special form 
of social influence in observational learning situations when it comes to learning about 
causally opaque and less efficient (compared to what comes natural to the dog) action 
demonstrations. 
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1  
 Introduction 
One of the striking characteristics of 12- to 24-month-old human infants’ social learning is 
that they are ready to imitate unusual ineYcient actions and replicate unnecessary aspects of 
the observed behaviour even if they themselves could use an obvious, more efficient method 
for reaching the same goal (MeltzoV 1988). Many investigations have targeted this 
“efficiency blindness”, and researchers argued that early imitation is a blind and automatic 
copying process (Tomasello et al. 1993) that reflects the immaturity of causal understanding 
in infants (Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001). In contrast, presuming a mentalistic interpretive 
stance in infants, others argue that infants attribute different goals and intentions to the 
demonstrator depending on their physical constraints (Bekkering et al. 2000; Carpenter et al. 
2002). In line with this later approach, recent studies provided 
evidence for the selective, inferential nature of the infants’ imitation of goal-directed actions 
(Schwier et al. 2006; Gergely et al. 2002; Carpenter et al. 1998; Carpenter et al. 2002). 
Gergely et al. (2002), for example, found that when an unusual, less efficient action 
(switching a light box on with the head) is demonstrated in a manner that is cognitively 
opaque to the infant (there is no obvious reason why the demonstrator did not use her hand, 
the familiar and clearly more efficient alternative means action), 14-monthold infants are 
willing to re-enact the observed head action. In contrast, if the demonstrator was prevented 
from using the efficient solution due to obvious physical reasons (i.e. her hands were 
engaged), infants did not copy the demonstrated head action but selected a more efficient 
plausible method to reach the goal (i.e. they used their hands to switch the light on). 
Regarding non-human animal species, recent findings suggest efficiency sensitivity in 
monkeys (Wood et al. 2007; Rochat et al. 2008) and selective imitation (copying less efficient 
action only if it is unexpected and does not Wt to the situational constraints) in apes 
(Buttelmann et al. 2007, 2008). Horner and Whiten (2005) found that chimpanzees are willing 
to copy when it is not obvious how the action will bring about a desired result, which means 
that the observed action is cognitively opaque. When the demonstrated action is causally 
irrelevant, they do not copy but choose an emulative solution. Dogs are also reported to show 
“infant-like selective imitation” (Range et al. 2007); however, in contrast to earlier studies 
(Topál et al. 2006), their imitative abilities have recently been challenged (Miller et al. 2009; 
Tennie et al. 2009). In addition to causal opacity, another factor that is thought to be 
important in the emergence of “efficiency blindness” and in the aforementioned selective 
responsiveness in imitation is whether the human demonstrator presents his/her action in an 
ostensive–communicative–referential manner. Recent studies on infant social cognition 
provide convergent evidence indicating that young preverbal infants are prone to show special 
sensitivity and preference for a basic set of ostensive–communicative signals (such as direct 
eye contact, being addressed in motherese, turn-taking contingent reactivity—Ricciardelli et 
al. 2000; Cleveland and Striano 2007; Nielsen 2006; Senju and Csibra 2008; Yoon et al. 
2008) and referential cues (such as gaze-shift or pointing—Teuscher and Triesch 2007; Senju 
et al. 2006; Grossmann et al. 2008; Tomasello 2008). It has been argued that human infants 
are biologically prepared to interpret such cues as expressing the other’s overt communicative 
intention towards them to convey new and relevant information about referents (see Gergely 
and Csibra 2006; Gergely et al. 2007; Csibra and Gergely 2009). Clearly, such early 
sensitivity to communicative cues may provide a necessary cognitive prerequisite that 
supports preverbal infants’ early emerging competence to engage in different types of triadic 
interactions, including social learning by imitation (Warneken and Tomasello 2007; 
Tomasello and Haberl 2003; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Moll et al. 2008). Ostensive–
communicative and referential cues guide the infants’ attention and influence their inferences 
and interpretations about the action demonstration so that they will 
be more willing to imitate unusual and less efficient actions. In support of this view, it was 
found that ostensive–communicative demonstration context facilitates such responses as 
perseverative search errors (Topál et al.  2008). In addition to human infants, there is another 
species, the domestic dog (Canis familiaris), that reportedly possess special skills in utilizing 
ostensive–referential cues (for reviews see Topál et al. 2009a; Reid 2009). Dogs during their 
evolution in an anthropogenic environment (paralleled by the divergence from the wolf) have 
become selected to show increased sociality (Gácsi et al. 2005; Topál et al. 2005; Bräuer et al. 
2006), co-operability (Miklósi et al. 2003) and communicability (Hare et al. 2002; Virányi et 
al. 2008; Gácsi et al. 2009). 
In particular, recent results indicate that dogs have evolved a special preference for a wide 
range of cues of human ostensive and referential communication (such as eye contact, being 
verbally addressed, gaze-shift, body orientation and pointing—Bräuer et al. 2006; Gácsi et al. 
2009). While direct eye contact typically functions as a threat cue in most animal species (e.g. 
Topál and Csányi 1994), dogs are unique among non-human animals to show sensitivity and 
preference for this ostensive cue of human communication (Kaminski et al. 2009; Topál et al. 
2009a). For example, in two-way choice tasks in which dogs have a possibility to choose one 
of the possible hiding locations, subjects are biased to select the location mistakenly indicated 
by the human’s ostensive–communicative referential cues especially if the human 
demonstrator is present during choice (Topál et al. 2009b) and even if they had been 
unambiguously informed about the location of the reward (Szetei et al. 2003; Erdöhegyi et al. 
2007). These results are of great importance because in line with other studies (Hare and 
Tomasello 2005; Hare et al. 2002), they point to the strong impact of human communicative 
cues on dogs’ behaviour and suggest the hypothesis that dogs may also show evidence for 
infant-like context-dependent “efficiency blindness” in observational learning situations. 
Reviewing the recent literature, it is unclear, however, how the two potentially interacting 
factors, the ostensive– communicative signals of the demonstration context and the presence 
of the human instructor during the choice contribute to the emergence of the aforementioned 
efficiency blindness in the dog. Therefore, in this study, we investigated how the different 
combinations of these two factors affect the behaviour of dogs in a two-way choice 
observational learning task. In the demonstration phase subjects could see how a tennis ball 
can be retrieved from under an opaque container by the manipulation of a distant and 
obviously empty (transparent) one. Importantly, the situation was conflicting as subjects 
could either rely on the observed action (selecting the human-manipulated empty container) 
or emulate the goal by performing a more efficient alternative solution (selecting the baited 
container). On the basis of the recent findings, we assumed that for dogs, human ostensive–
communicative cuing serves as a primarily imperative function by triggering a motivation to 
replicate the observed action. Moreover, as an imperative order is usually associated with a 
specific ‘instructor’ giving it, we could expect the highest tendency to rely on the human’s 
less efficient action (manipulating the empty container) if it was not only accentuated by 
ostensive–communicative signals but the demonstrator personally remained present during 
the test phase. 
 
Methods 
Subjects 
Dogs (Canis familiaris; N = 116) and their owners were recruited from various dog training 
schools in Austria and Hungary. Participation in the tests was voluntary and the only criterion 
for selection was that the dogs had to be highly motivated to play with a toy. Owners were 
instructed verbally before the experiment what to do and what to say during the demonstration 
and the test phases. Seven dogs were excluded from the final analyses due to technical 
reasons (inaccurate demonstration—4 dogs; problem with the recording—1 dog; the owner 
did not act in line with instructions—2 dogs). Thirteen dogs did not meet the selection criteria 
of the pre-test (see in “Procedure”), and there were twenty dogs that had passed the pre-test, 
but were unwilling to participate in the test (totally lost interest in the task and did not make 
any choice). The dogs (N = 76, mean age: 3.8 years, range: 1–14 years) that were included in 
the final analyses were participated randomly in five experimental groups (see below). Each 
dog was tested only once. Subjects were from various breeds (52 purebred dogs from 40 
different breeds and 24 mongrels). The overall sex ratio of dogs was balanced (38 males and 
38 females). 
Experimental arrangement 
The experimental observations were carried out between June 2006 and August 2008. Dogs 
were tested either at the Department of Ethology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest (N = 
53) or at the Department for Behaviour, Neurobiology and Cognition, Vienna University (N = 
23). The same experimental setup and apparatus were used in both cases. A transparent and 
an opaque plastic container of similar shape and size (16 cm high and 16 cm in diameter) 
were placed 0.6 m apart. Both were turned upside down and placed on a black platform (20 Ł 
20 Ł 6 cm). The white opaque container was used to hide the target object (a tennis ball). The 
platform was slightly aslope so that the tennis ball rolled down if the baited container was 
elevated. The two containers were connected by the means of a string, which was led through 
2 pulleys that were fixed to the ceiling. An orange curtain covered the pulleys, and this was 
also used to prevent the dogs from witnessing some of the manipulations with the containers 
(see in “Procedure”). This apparatus makes the demonstrator possible to lift the opaque 
(baited) container by means of moving the empty transparent one horizontally (see Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the experimental apparatus 
 
Procedure 
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Connection 
The procedure included three phases. First, we tested the dogs’ motivation for participating in 
the task (Pre-test), then the human repeatedly (three times) demonstrated a less efficient 
solution of the task (i.e. she obtained the target object by means of manipulating the empty 
container - demonstration phase) and finally the dog was allowed to explore the experimental 
set up (Test trial). 
Pre-test 
The dog was led into the room and allowed to explore the room for 1 min while the 
demonstrator initiated a short play with the tennis ball. Then, the owner was asked to play a 
fetching game with the tennis ball. (S)he was instructed to throw the ball and to encourage 
verbally the dog to fetch it. Only those subjects were included in the experimental 
observations that retrieved the ball at least once out of the three fetching trials. A great 
majority of dogs (64 individuals out of 76) retrieved the ball each time, nine dogs were a bit 
less motivated (2 successful fetching trials) and there were only three ones that retrieved the 
ball only once. During this period, the experimental apparatus was covered by the curtain. 
Demonstration phase: Having been fulfilled the criterion of the pre-test, the dog was led by 
the owner to a predetermined point (at a distance of 3 m from the apparatus) and held it there 
by its collar. The demonstrator got the ball and placed it under the opaque container, while the 
curtain prevented the dog from witnessing the baiting procedure. Subjects were assigned in 
one of the five experimental groups so that the distribution of males/females and the mean age 
did not show significant differences between groups. Each group consisted of individuals 
from 8 to 9 different recognized breeds and 3–7 mongrels (Table 1). 
 
Group 
Demonstration 
phase: 
Test phase: 
Group size 
(Number 
of males)  
Mean age 
(years) +SD 
Number of 
different 
breeds 
(Number of 
mongrels) 
OC-D/present 
Demonstrator 
present 
17 (6) 4.3 + 3.5 9 (7) 
OC-D/absent 
Ostensive-
communicative 
demonstration 
Demonstrator 
absent 
17 (10) 4.2 + 1.9 9 (4) 
NC-D/present 
Demonstrator 
present 
14 (8) 2.5 + 1.9 9 (3) 
NC-D/absent 
Non-
communicative 
demonstration 
Demonstrator 
absent 
14 (8) 4.5 + 3.1 8 (5) 
Non-Social  
Remotely moved 
containers 
Experimenter 
present 
14 (6) 4 + 2.8 9 (5) 
 
Table 1 Summary of the experimental conditions and subjects 
 
Dogs witnessed the demonstrations in one of the following contexts 
Communicative demonstration (Com) The demonstrator (a 25-year-old woman) who was 
standing between the two containers pulled back the curtains and looked at the dog. She 
addressed the subject ( “[Dog’s Name]! + Watch!”), and when the dog looked at her face, she 
bent her upper body and touched the two containers simultaneously. Then, she took an upright 
position and addressed the dog again („Look at this!”). At the moment, the demonstrator 
could make eye contact with the dog she crouched grasping the transparent empty container 
by both hands and placing it to the ground ahead of the platform (Fig. 2a). Thereupon, the 
baited container elevated and the tennis ball rolled out towards the dog. The demonstrator 
turned her head towards the ball shifting her gaze conspicuously from the dog to the ball. 
Finally, she picked the ball up and dropped it to the ground two times, but she did not give it 
to the dog. She closed the curtain and replaced the ball under the opaque container. 
Non-communicative demonstration (NonCom) The procedure was identical to that described 
in the communicative demonstration condition, except for that the demonstrator performed 
the actions without ostensive–communicative signals (Fig. 2b). That is, she did not look at the 
dog and never addressed it. During the whole procedure, the demonstrator was mumbling a 
short poem. This was to attract the dogs’ attention to the demonstration non-communicatively, 
without giving any direct instruction to the dog. The position of the baited container (left or 
right hand side) was counterbalanced between subjects in each group. 
Test trial 
Immediately after the third demonstration, the demonstrator closed the curtain and placed the 
ball under the opaque container. Then, she pulled back the curtains again and either left the 
room (demonstrator absent condition) or remained there (demonstrator present condition). In 
the latter case, she was standing motionless at a predetermined point (on the left side of the 
dog). Once the demonstrator left or took her predetermined position, the owner released the 
dog and encouraged it (saying “You can go!” It’s yours!”) to explore and manipulate the 
apparatus. The trial was terminated after the dog approached and inspected both containers. If, 
however, the dog approached and/or inspected only one of the containers, the trial was 
terminated after 20 s. During this, the demonstrator did not talk to and did not look at the dog.  
Non-social control condition In order to make sure that dogs are able to memorize and recall 
the location of the tennis ball after three demonstrations and the movement of the empty 
container itself is not sufficient to distract subjects, a group of dogs were observed in non-
social context in which they could watch the moving containers without any human 
contribution. That is, in this condition, the experimenter did not participate in the 
demonstration as she was standing motionless behind the dog during the trials. Dogs could 
see the action demonstration (i.e. horizontal movement of the empty container and rolling the 
tennis ball out from under the elevated opaque container) without any direct manipulation by 
human as this was achieved by another human assistant moving the containers remotely (by 
means of fine nylon thread) from outside the experimental room. Subjects’ attention was 
attracted to the moving containers by the means of non-social sound effect (small hidden bells 
that were fixed to the string close to the containers). After the tennis ball had rolled out the 
Experimenter went to the apparatus, she picked the ball up and dropped it to the ground two 
times, but she did not communicate and did not give it to the dog. Then, she closed the curtain 
and replaced the ball under the opaque container. Finally, she went back and stood behind the 
dog. The whole session was videotaped by two cameras (one facing the subject and one 
facing the experimental apparatus), and the behaviour of subjects was analysed later. Data 
collection and analysis A container was regarded as chosen if the dog turned it over or 
touched it with its paw/muzzle or at least approached it (its paw/muzzle was closer than 5 cm 
to the container). To assess inter-observer agreement, a second person blind to the 
demonstration condition scored a randomly selected sample of 63%. Cohen’s kappa value 
was 0.904, showing a high level of reliability. There were only 2 disagreements between the 
two coders: 1–1 in the Com-D/ present and NonCom-D/not present conditions. In both cases, 
the second coder categorized the dogs’ response as “empty”. In these cases, the dogs’ choice 
behaviour was ambivalent: they approached the empty container, but while passing by the 
empty container, they turned their head towards the baited one—so their nose was not closer 
than 5 cm to the empty container. Moreover, right after passing by the empty container, these 
dogs approached directly and touched the baited one. The two coders discussed these cases of 
disagreements and finally they accepted the first coder’s evaluation (“baited”). We recorded 
three variables: (a) the first choice (i.e. whether the dogs inspected first the baited or the 
empty container) (b) the shift between the locations (i.e. whether they proceeded to the other 
container after one had been visited) and (c) the latency of the firstly selected container (i.e. 
the time elapsed between the moment the owner released the dog and it approached one of the 
containers). For the analysis of the dogs’ first choice, we employed binomial tests to see 
whether there was significant bias towards the empty or baited location within the groups and 
the effects of demonstration context (communicative vs. non-communicative), and the 
presence of demonstrator during the test trial on the dogs’ first choices was analysed by 
Generalized Linear Model for binary data (SPSS, version 17). Normality tests (Kolmogorov–
SmirnoV) for the latency data did not show significant deviations from normal distribution in 
any of the five experimental groups, however, the differences among standard deviations were 
significant (Levene’s test; P = 0.016). Thus, we employed reciprocal transformation (1/x) for 
the raw data and then latencies of the dogs’ first choice in the five groups were analysed by 
univariate ANOVAs. Finally, to check whether dogs actually did attend to the presentation 
equally across demonstration contexts, we also coded the subjects’ attentiveness on the basis 
of their head and gaze orientation. To this, we discriminated gazing towards the human 
demonstrator and gazing towards the baited container. Turning the head to any other 
directions was coded as “looking away”. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Photo illustration of the a Communicative demonstration (Com) and b Non-
Communicative demonstration (NonCom) 
  
Results 
In order to characterize the dogs’ “baseline” task performance, first we analysed the choice 
behaviour of subjects in the non-social control condition. Dogs were ready to participate in 
the task, they made their first choice within a few seconds (mean latency = 3.7 s). In most 
cases (11 out of 14), the firstly selected container was the baited one, and this tendency was 
marginally significant (binomial test, n = 14, P = 0.057). The preference for the baited 
location is further supported by the finding that all individuals inspected the baited container 
and many of them (6 dogs) visited only the baited one (i.e. did not proceed to the empty 
container). However, none of the subjects could retrieve the ball in this group. In the social 
demonstration contexts, in which we tested the effects of the communicative signals and the 
presence of the demonstrator in a 2 x 2 experimental design, dogs showed an overall 
preference for the baited container. In 72.6% of the total trials, they first inspected the baited 
container (binomial test, N = 62, p < 0.0001) and there were only seven dogs (11.3%) who did 
not visit the baited location. A group by group analysis of the firstly selected container 
showed that the presence or absence of the demonstrator during choice had no influence on 
dogs’ first choice in the non-communicative demonstration contexts (subjects preferred to 
choose the baited container in both NonCom-D/present and NonCom-D/absent conditions; 
binomial test, p = 0.002 for both).  
However, after having watched a communicative demonstration, dogs showed the same 
selection bias only when the demonstrator was absent (binomial test, p = 0.049) but not when 
she was present (binomial test, p = 0.332) (Fig. 3). 
The GLM analysis of the dogs’ first choice as a function of both independent variables 
(presence or absence of the human’s communicative action; presence or absence of the 
demonstrator during choice) showed significant effect of the demonstration context (Com vs. 
NonCom; chi2(1) = 7.585, p = 0.006). In contrast, neither the presence of the demonstrator 
(D/present vs. D/absent; chi2(1) = 1.163, p = 0.281) nor the interaction of the two factors 
proved to be significant (chi2(1) = 1.163, p = 0.281). During the test trial, dogs had a 
possibility to approach and inspect both containers, or they could select only one of these. 
Based on these possibilities subjects were categorized in one of the three response categories 
(i.e. “empty only”, “baited only” and “both”—see Table 2).  
 
                          Container inspected by the dog 
Groups Empty Only Baited Only Both 
OC /D-present 35.3% 17.6% 47.1% 
OC /D-absent 5.9% 35.3% 58.8% 
NC /D-present 0% 64.3% 35.7% 
NC /D-absent 0% 71.4% 28.6% 
NS 0% 42.9% 57.1% 
 
Table 2 Proportion of dogs inspecting only the baited, only the empty, or both containers 
during the test trials 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Percentage of dogs approaching and inspecting the baited container first in the 
different demonstration contexts. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; (*) p < 0.06 in comparison with 
the success rate expected by random search (binomial tests) 
 
Results show that compared to other experimental groups, those subjects who were tested in 
the presence of the demonstrator after having witnessed ostensive–communicative 
demonstrations (Com-D/present group) showed different distribution across the three 
response categories. The “empty only” response was observed only in the ostensive– 
communicative demonstration contexts (in these two groups 7 out of the 34 individuals 
inspected only the empty container). It is also important to note that majority of these subjects 
(6) were from the “demonstrator present” condition and only one dog did so when the 
demonstrator was absent (Com-D/present vs. Com-D/absent: Fisher’s exact test, P = 0.085). 
Nevertheless, only some individuals (Com-D/present: 2 individuals out of 17, Com-D/absent: 
6/17, NonCom-D/ present: 4/14, NonCom-D/absent: 1/14) could retrieve the tennis ball by 
pushing over the baited container during the test trial (comparison across conditions: Kruskal–
Wallis Test, chi2(4) = 9.351, p = 0.053). None of them could retrieve the ball by manipulating 
the empty side. Finally, we found that all 76 dogs followed the demonstrations with full 
attention (i.e. they never looked away for longer than a second during the three trials, and the 
majority of them (74) shifted their gaze towards the baited container at the moment when the 
tennis ball rolled out in at least 2 out of the 3 trials. Only two dogs were that turned their 
heads only once towards the baited container out of the three trials when the ball emerged 
from under it. This fact and the finding that we did not find significant differences between 
groups in terms of their latency of approaching and inspecting the apparatus (F4,71 = 0.409, P 
= 0.802, Fig. 4) provide strong support for that differences between the conditions could not 
be explained by differential attention and/or motivation for participating in the choice task. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Mean latency (s) of approaching the apparatus in the different demonstration 
contexts. Error bars represent SEM 
 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we investigated whether dogs show infant-like “efficiency blindness” in an 
observational learning situation depending on the ostensive–communicative signals from 
human demonstrator and the presence of the demonstrator during their choice.  
Actually the task presented here for the dogs was not demanding cognitively. There were only 
two possible alternatives: a transparent container, which was clearly empty, and a non-
transparent one under which an attractive toy object was hidden (and the dog was repeatedly 
informed about this fact). What makes the task a bit more complex for dogs was that the 
location of the reward and the human manipulation were spatially separated because during 
the demonstration phase the toy object repeatedly emerged from under the non-transparent 
container by moving the transparent one. It seems that the unusual and causally opaque 
demonstrations in general cannot distract the dogs’ attention from the goal and cannot inhibit 
the dog from approaching the baited container directly. Binomial tests revealed that in 3 out 
of 4 experimental contexts (Com-D/ absent, NonCom-D/present, NonCom-D/absent) as well 
as in the non-social control condition significant proportion of the dogs (73–93%) visited the 
baited container first. These findings suggest that subjects could recall the place of the reward, 
they were motivated to retrieve it and were not distracted or misled by the moving empty 
container and/or by the human’s ‘misleading’ actions.  
 Although in general dogs preferred the simpler, evident solution (direct approach) over 
the less efficient demonstrated one, there was a combination of the situational factors that led 
to a reduced tendency of goal directedness. Namely, when human manipulated the empty 
container expressing her overt communicative intention towards the dog and she was still 
present during the testing phase (Com-D/present), subjects did not show significant bias to the 
baited container. It seems therefore that after having observed communicative manipulation of 
the empty container the presence of the demonstrator has some influence on the dogs’ choice 
behaviour. This effect, however, seems only marginal as the overall (GLM) analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of the demonstration context (presence or absence of social 
communicative cues), but no main effect of the demonstrator’s presence during the test phase. 
One possible explanation of these results is based on a motivational account. Recent evidence 
suggests that in social learning situations ostensive–communicative cues may trigger higher 
levels of arousal and activity in dogs (Range et al. 2009a). Thus, one may assume that the 
change in the dogs’ search pattern lies in the differential motivational effect of the different 
demonstration conditions. That is, dogs were better motivated to participate in the task (they 
were more willing to approach and inspect the apparatus as a whole) in the communicative 
demonstration conditions and this, incidentally, led to a higher probability of visiting the 
empty container. This account, however, is not supported by the latency data showing that 
dogs made their choice shortly after having released (within 3–5 s on average) in each 
condition, and there were only three dogs out of the 76 (2 in Com-D/present and 1 in 
NonCom-D/present groups) that did not make their first choice within 10 s. This suggests that 
although dogs were similarly motivated to participate in the task, there could be specific 
differences in their decision-making processes across contexts. Another explanation can be 
raised on the basis of the dogs’ attention and memory processes. Recently, it has been shown 
that attention is an important variable when testing dogs in social situations (Range et al. 
2009b). In line with this, one may suppose that signals expressing the demonstrator’s 
communicative intent focused the dog’s attention to the steps of demonstration and therefore 
enhanced the capacity of the dog to encode the human’s actions during the observation and 
display more effective recall during choice (see also Pongrácz et al. 2004). Moreover, the 
presence of the human demonstrator in the testing phase probably acted as a ‘reminder cue’, 
which facilitated recalling the demonstration. It follows from these that the presence of the 
human demonstrator in the test phase and the communicative signals as a part of the 
demonstration could have had an independent (additive) effect leading to a decrease in goal-
directed search behaviour (selecting the baited container). Importantly, our results do not 
seem to support this account as we could find only marginal effect of the human’s presence 
during the test phase on the dogs’ choice behaviour. 
A further potential explanation may be linked to the phenomenon of local enhancement, a 
learning mechanism by which a particular location is made more salient to an individual by 
various means involving social communicative cues. Some studies have reported that dogs 
show a tendency to carry out a counterproductive response in object choice situations if one 
location is misleadingly indicated by the human communicative cues (Szetei et al. 2003; 
Erdöhegyi et al. 2007; Prato-Previde et al. 2008), and this strange social influence of the 
human on dogs’ performance may stem from the local enhancement mechanism. In our study, 
however, local enhancement account is not fully supported by the results. First, although there 
was a clear difference between the non-social control and non-communicative demonstration 
contexts as regards the saliency of the empty container, the different local enhancing effect is 
not reflected in dogs’ choice response. Finally, we can offer a social communicative account, 
for the findings we found. In our experiment, human demonstration might have two possible 
roles: acted as triggering and facilitating either a preference for obtaining the desired object in 
the most effcient way or rather to act in line with the human demonstration. In the former 
case, the demonstration could be perceived as not having communicative flavour and moving 
of the empty container simply informed the dog about the goal of the task (‘there is a ball 
under the opaque container’). Results show that dogs in the non-communicative 
demonstration contexts mainly utilized this kind of emulative meaning of the observed 
demonstrations and they preferred the effective, species-specific solution (approaching the 
baited container directly). However, the human’s demonstration could also be perceived as 
communicative manifestation that acted as not only making the subject to recognize the 
location of the reward but manifesting a specific behaviour. This raises the possibility that the 
demonstration of this causally opaque, inefficient action was regarded as a communicative 
manifestation of an ‘episodic imperative’ by the human (‘Go to the empty container!’). 
Actually, it seems that in those conditions in which demonstrations were accompanied by the 
human’s communicative signals, especially if the human demonstrator remained present 
during test trials, dogs showed some tendency of using the human referential cues to specify 
the spatial location where the act was required to be performed, and as a consequence, they 
selected the baited container less frequently in comparison with other demonstration contexts. 
It is also important to note that dogs typically show a predisposition towards engaging in joint 
activities with humans and they frequently request human help if a problem is insoluble (e.g. 
Miklósi et al. 2003). Moreover, dogs may be able to recognize components of how humans 
need to behave to produce the desired result without understanding the causal relations 
involved in the process (e.g. human moves object that activates pulley). In line with this, 
dogs’ responses in this experiment can not only be interpreted as behaviours intended towards 
producing a solution to the problem themselves but a situation involving collaboration. The 
notion that dogs tried to use the human demonstrator as a “social tool” to reproduce the 
desired result is supported by the observation that only a few (2–6) dogs obtained the reward 
on their own in the different experimental conditions as if they were waiting for the human’s 
help in spite of the fact that retrieving an object from under an opaque container is motorically 
not a demanding task for a dog. In addition to providing further support for the importance of 
the social communicative signals in observational learning situations, the results of the 
present study raise the possibility that like in infants (Király 2009), the presence of the human 
demonstrator also plays some behaviour modulating and constraining role in observational 
learning situations when it comes to learning about causally opaque and less eYcient 
(compared to what comes natural to the dog) action demonstrations. In certain situations, 
dogs’ behaviour is probably driven by a motivation to satisfy ostensively signalled human 
imperatives in the ‘here-and-now’ (Topál et al. 2009b) and the ostensively communicated 
human action demonstrations can be functionally interpreted as imperatives by dogs with the 
function of performing the observed action in the presence of (and ‘for’) the human 
demonstrator. In agreement with the studies showing specific sensitivity to human’s 
communicative signals in dogs (Erdőhegyi et al. 2007; Kaminski et al. 2009; Riedel et al. 
2008), we propose that for the dog, the function of human demonstration is not (only) 
transferring knowledge but disposing behaviour actions. Supposedly, this form of social 
influence has been evolved to evade conflicts in the group and to co-operate in common 
actions without any deeper insight into the knowledge content of other’s mind. Nevertheless, 
future studies are needed in order to reveal, whether the influential effect of communicative 
signals of the demonstration context on dogs’ choice actually reflected their willingness to 
follow a specific order or communicative cueing and other contextual factors simply 
distracted them from the more effective, emulative solution.  
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